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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 No. 10-3439 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
REGINA TOLLIVER, 
             Appellant 
_______________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 D.C. Criminal No. 08-cr-00026-001 
 (Honorable Berle M. Schiller) 
______________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 September 13, 2011 
 
 Before:  SLOVITER, SCIRICA and SMITH, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Filed:  September 15, 2011) 
_________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 Regina Tolliver was convicted by a jury of bank fraud, aggravated identity theft, 
and unauthorized access of a computer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1028A, and 
1030, respectively.  She was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment and a five-year term 
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of supervised release.  Tolliver was ordered to pay restitution of $181,577 and a special 
assessment of $900.  We will affirm. 
I. 
A. 
 Between March and November 2007 two different “check runners” cashed 
fraudulent checks against the accounts of seven Citizens Bank customers in branches in 
upstate New York, western Pennsylvania, and Delaware.1
 At the time of the fraud, Citizens Bank used computer systems to manage and 
track its customer accounts.  The systems contained customers’ personal information, 
including names, addresses, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, driver’s license 
numbers, and Citizens Bank account numbers and balances.  Bank employees could 
access this information in either the mainframe or touch point computer systems by 
entering their employee number and password.
  The checks were drawn on 
banks other than Citizens Bank and were rejected as fraudulent.  Initially the Citizens 
Bank customers were charged the checks’ face value.  However, once it was determined 
the customers were the victims of fraud, Citizens Bank credited their accounts and 
absorbed the total loss of $181,577. 
2
                                                 
1 A check runner is member of a bank fraud scheme who is responsible for cashing 
fraudulent checks at a bank.  Eileen Comire and Richard Maden were identified as the 
check runners in the scheme in which Tolliver was involved.  They were indicted 
separately, and each entered guilty pleas.  Neither testified at Tolliver’s trial. 
 
2 The mainframe system is the basic system to which tellers would generally have access.  
The touch point system is the platform to which customer service and management staff 
would have access.  The touch point system allows employees to access customers by 
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 Testimony at trial revealed that Citizens Bank employees are assigned a non-
confidential employee number and then choose their passwords.  Employees are 
instructed to keep their passwords secure, confidential, and not to write them down.  
Employees are not allowed to share their passwords with anyone else, including each 
other.  If someone believes that another person has learned of his password, he is required 
to inform management and change the password.  If an employee must leave a computer 
terminal where he is working, the employee is required to temporarily lock the terminal 
or sign off completely.  Employees use their passwords between ten and fifteen times a 
day and are required to change them every two to three months. 
 When an employee accesses either the mainframe or touch point systems, data 
concerning the activity is archived in an employee tracking system for approximately six 
months.  This system is known as the “employee footprint” and can be recalled to 
determine the employee number entered to access certain accounts.  Citizens Bank senior 
fraud investigator Todd Swoyer ran a footprint report for each of the compromised 
accounts.  He discovered that Tolliver’s employee number was the only one that was 
associated with each of the accounts.  In addition, his investigation showed that, with one 
exception, after Tolliver’s number and password were entered to look up account 
information, someone called the Citizens Bank automated system to check the accounts.  
These calls were made either the day after the accounts were accessed or a few days to 
                                                                                                                                                             
name or account number and provides a brief history of the customer, including personal 
information, account numbers, and balances.  
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weeks before the fraudulent checks were cashed against them.  All five of the victims 
who testified said they did not make these calls. 
 Swoyer’s investigation revealed that the seven customers’ accounts were accessed 
under Tolliver’s employee number on February 5 and 8, 2007, and on March 7, 8, and 9, 
2007.  The Citizens Bank information technology service determined that on February 5 
accounts from the first three victims were compromised from the King of Prussia Mall 
branch where Tolliver was employed.3
 During the time of the investigation, Citizens Bank employees who contacted a 
customer during the business day were required to record it in their logbook. Tolliver’s 
logbook did not show that she contacted any of the seven victims for business purposes 
on the dates their accounts were accessed.  Tolliver was also not assigned to contact any 
of these individuals for sales purposes on those dates.  Citizens Bank employees were not 
permitted to look at a customer’s account and personal information without a business 
purpose.  
  Attendance records confirmed that only Tolliver 
and branch assistant manager Angela Anderson worked on all of these days.  Anderson 
testified she never knew Tolliver’s password and never signed into a computer terminal 
someone else was already using.   
 Swoyer, United States Postal Inspector Frank Busch, and a Secret Service agent 
interviewed Tolliver on March 15, 2007.  Swoyer testified that he reviewed Tolliver’s 
entire logbook with her during her interview.  Her book included a page that had 
                                                 
3 It was not determined from which Citizens Bank branch accounts were accessed on the 
other four days. 
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passwords written on it.  Swoyer testified that the passwords were for HR Express, a 
system unrelated to the mainframe or touch point systems.  Further, he stated that 
Tolliver told him that she had not given her password to anyone and that she always 
logged off her computer when she walked away from a terminal.  All seven of Tolliver’s 
former co-workers who testified said they never knew her password or saw it written 
down.  Tolliver was terminated immediately following her interview. 
 On January 17, 2008, Tolliver was indicted on one count of bank fraud, and aiding 
and abetting bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344; seven counts of aggravated 
identity theft, and aiding and abetting aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1028A; and one count of access of a computer in excess of authorization to obtain a 
financial record, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030.  She was the only defendant charged in 
the indictment. 
B. 
 At trial, the Government called United States Postal Inspector Frank Busch to 
testify as an expert on the operation of bank fraud schemes.  Busch had over fourteen 
years of experience investigating financial crimes with the United States Postal 
Inspection Service.  He received extensive training in criminal financial investigations 
from multiple agencies, including the United States Attorney’s Office and the 
International Association of Financial Crimes Investigators.  He estimated that he had 
completed 1000 fraud and identity theft investigations and acted mainly as lead 
investigator in such matters.  He stated he investigated hundreds of bank fraud and 
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identity theft cases in Philadelphia, including twenty involving bank employees.  Defense 
counsel did not object to Busch testifying as an expert witness.   
 Busch testified that there are certain players involved in a typical bank 
fraud/identity theft scheme:  a designated ringleader; a second in command who 
facilitates recruiting other members; individuals, such as bank employees, who access 
personal information of account holders to use in the scheme; individuals who access or 
create counterfeit documents; drivers who take check runners to the banks; and check 
runners who cash the checks.  According to Busch, a bank employee who was part of a 
scheme usually would be in touch with the ringleader of the operation or the middle man 
who recruited him, but would not have contact with the check runners.  In Busch’s 
experience, check runners generally did not know the identity of the person who was 
obtaining the information necessary to facilitate the crime. 
 Busch explained that a bank employee involved in a fraudulent scheme would 
access personal information about an account holder, write it down or print it out, and 
then pass it along to other members of the operation in exchange for money.  He testified 
that it is common for someone in the scheme to call a bank’s automated system to 
confirm that the targeted accounts are active and functioning properly. 
 Tolliver did not testify at trial.  She was found guilty by the jury of all charges.  
Following her conviction, she submitted a motion seeking judgment of acquittal and/or a 
new trial, contending that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to support the 
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jury’s verdict and the government improperly shifted the burden of proof to her.4  The 
District Court denied the motions.  After being appointed new counsel,5
II. 
 Tolliver filed a 
supplemental motion for judgment of acquittal and/or motion for a new trial.  Tolliver 
again challenged the sufficiency of the evidence.  She also asserted that her trial 
counsel’s performance was constitutionally ineffective and that the District Court 
committed plain error by allowing Inspector Busch’s expert testimony.  The District 
Court denied both motions. 
 Tolliver raises four issues on appeal. 6
A. 
  She contends (1) there was insufficient 
evidence to support the jury’s verdict; (2) the District Court erred by allowing Inspector 
Busch’s expert testimony on the modus operandi of bank fraud schemes; (3) the District 
Court erred by determining her trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for 
failing to object to Inspector Busch’s testimony; and (4) the District Court erred by 
denying her post-trial motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial pursuant to 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 and 33, respectively. 
                                                 
4 Tolliver had previously moved for a judgment of acquittal after the close of the 
prosecution’s case.  The motion was denied. 
5 After Tolliver’s trial counsel failed to submit a sentencing memorandum for her 
sentencing hearing, the District Judge held an in-chambers conference with both the 
prosecution and defense.  Afterwards he informed Tolliver he would reschedule the 
sentencing to another date and would appoint her new counsel.  The Court then appointed 
Tolliver’s present counsel. 
6 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we exercise appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 Tolliver contends the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it 
was she who used her employee information to access the victims’ accounts.7
1. Bank fraud 
  
Specifically, she contends there was no evidence to show from which Citizens Bank 
branch victims’ accounts were accessed on four out of the five days in question.  Nor was 
there evidence that the accounts were accessed from a specific computer terminal that 
Tolliver was using.  In addition, Tolliver claims there was no proof that she had any 
knowledge or connection to other members in the bank fraud, or that she had a romantic 
or financial motive to participate in the scheme.  Nonetheless, there was sufficient 
evidence to find her guilty. 
 The government needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Tolliver 
“knowingly execute[d], or attempt[ed] to execute a scheme or artifice (1) to defraud a 
financial institution; or (2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, 
or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises.”  18 U.S.C. § 1344.  
“[W]here the bank is a direct target of the deceptive conduct or scheme, § 1344 is 
satisfied by proof of a specific intent to defraud the bank plus fraudulent conduct (e.g., 
                                                 
7 We “apply a particularly deferential standard of review when deciding whether a jury 
verdict rests on legally sufficient evidence.”  United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d 
Cir. 1998).  We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, however 
“[i]t is not for us to weigh the evidence or to determine the credibility of the witnesses.”  
Id. (quoting United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996)).  Considering the 
evidence in this light, together with “inferences logically deducible therefrom,” we must 
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  United States v. McNeill, 887 F.2d 448, 450 (3d Cir.1989). 
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misrepresentations) which creates an actual loss or risk of loss.”  United States v. Leahy, 
445 F.3d 634, 646 (3d Cir. 2006).  To convict Tolliver of aiding and abetting bank fraud, 
the government had to prove:  “(1) that [bank fraud] ha[d] been committed; and (2) that 
[Tolliver] knew of the commission of the [bank fraud] and acted with intent to facilitate 
it.”  United States v. Soto, 539 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 When viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence, and its 
corresponding inferences, were sufficient for a rational jury to convict Tolliver of bank 
fraud and of aiding abetting bank fraud.  The government proved that Tolliver’s 
employee number was the only one that was used to look up confidential information for 
all of the victims’ accounts.  Further, the accounts were accessed on five days that only 
Tolliver and one other employee worked at the King of Prussia Mall branch.  That 
employee testified she did not know Tolliver’s password and never used a computer 
terminal that someone was already using.  This testimony jibes with what Tolliver told 
investigators during her interview, to wit, that she always logged out of her computer 
when she left a terminal and she never gave her password to anyone.  This all supports 
the conclusion that it was Tolliver who accessed the accounts.  That she had no business 
purpose for doing so, that her access was soon followed by phone calls to check the 
accounts, and that individuals later cashed fraudulent checks against the accounts support 
the inference that Tolliver’s access was the first step in a “fraudulent scheme that placed 
the bank at a risk of loss.”  United States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 505 (3d Cir. 2003).  
Since “§ 1344’s specific intent requirement is satisfied if an individual commits an act 
that could put the bank at a risk of loss,” id., the government established that Tolliver had 
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the requisite intent to facilitate the bank fraud.  These findings support not only the 
conviction for bank fraud but the conviction for aiding and abetting the crime as well. 
 Tolliver contends that the existence of a page in her logbook containing passwords 
and the potential for employees to log in to multiple computers at once undermine the 
jury’s verdict.  We disagree.  First, there was nothing at trial to suggest Tolliver’s 
password had been compromised.  Further, “evidence does not need to be inconsistent 
with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can 
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 
300, 311 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254 (3d 
Cir.1977)).  Because a rational trier of fact could have inferred from the evidence that 
Tolliver committed the bank fraud, it is not necessary that all other potential inferences 
be excluded.  “There is no requirement . . . that the inference drawn by the jury be the 
only inference possible or that the government’s evidence foreclose every possible 
innocent explanation.”  United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 97 n.3 (3d Cir. 1992).  
Therefore we will affirm the bank fraud convictions. 
2.  Aggravated identity theft 
 To convict Tolliver of aggravated identity theft, the government had to prove that 
she “knowingly transfer[red], possesse[d], or use[d], without lawful authority, a means of 
identification of another person” during the commission of bank fraud.  18 U.S.C. § 
1028A(a)(1), (c).  For her charge of aiding and abetting, the government was required to 
prove:  “(1) that [identity theft] ha[d] been committed; and (2) that [Tolliver] knew of the 
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commission of the [identity theft] and acted with intent to facilitate it.”  Soto, 539 F.3d at 
194. 
 There was sufficient evidence to support Tolliver’s aggravated identity theft 
convictions.  The government showed that Tolliver’s employee number was used to 
access the victims’ account information and that she had no legitimate business purpose 
to do so.  The government also showed that someone later called the Citizens Bank phone 
system to check these accounts, and two people eventually cashed false checks against 
them.  A rational jury could infer from this that Tolliver accessed the customer accounts 
and then passed the information along to someone else to further the bank fraud scheme.  
These inferences would support the aggravated identity theft convictions. 
 Tolliver contends that the fact that the check runners did not implicate her 
undermines the validity of the verdict.  However, Inspector Busch’s testimony made clear 
that check runners typically do not know the bank employee “insider” who supplies 
information because the employee has a coveted position within the scheme and deals 
with someone higher in the chain of command.  Though Tolliver is correct that Inspector 
Busch also testified that a typical bank fraud involves more individuals than just a bank 
insider, check runners, and someone who calls to check on the accounts, the lack of 
evidence of other actors in the present case does not negate the jury’s verdict.  The jury 
was free to focus on the similarities between the evidence presented and a typical scheme 
rather than the differences.  Furthermore, there was a “logical and convincing connection 
between the facts established and the conclusion inferred.”  McNeill, 887 F.2d at 450.  
We will affirm the jury’s verdict accordingly. 
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3.  Unauthorized access of a financial record 
 To prove Tolliver was guilty of unauthorized access of a financial record, the 
government was required to establish that she “intentionally accesse[d] a computer 
without authorization or exceed[ed] authorized access, and thereby obtain[ed] . . . 
information contained in a financial record of a financial institution.”  18 U.S.C. § 
1030(a)(2)(A) (2008).  “Actual asportation, in the sense of physically removing the data 
from its original location or transcribing the data, need not be proved in order to establish 
a violation of [subsection 1030(a)(2)].” S. Rep. No. 99-432 at 2484 (1986). 
 As already discussed, there was sufficient evidence from which to infer that 
Tolliver intentionally accessed the customers’ accounts and that she did not have a 
business purpose to do so.  As such, the government established that Tolliver exceeded 
her authorized access, and we will affirm her conviction for this offense. 
 We conclude that all of Tolliver’s convictions were premised on sufficient 
evidence, and thus we will deny her request for relief on this ground.  We also will affirm 
the District Court’s denial of Tolliver’s motion for judgment of acquittal and/or a new 
trial based on insufficiency of the evidence. 
B. 
 Tolliver contends the District Court committed plain error by allowing 
Investigator Busch to testify as an expert witness on the modus operandi of bank fraud 
schemes because the testimony violated Fed. R. Evid. 702, 403, and the Confrontation 
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Clause of the Sixth Amendment.8
 Fed. R. Evid. 702 “embodies a trilogy of restrictions on expert testimony:  
qualification, reliability and fit.”  Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2003).  
Regarding fit, expert testimony “must be relevant for the purposes of the case and must 
assist the trier of fact.”  Id.  In other words, it must be “sufficiently tied to the facts of the 
case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute.” United States v. Downing, 753 
F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985).  
  Specifically, she claims Busch’s testimony lacked 
foundation and fit because many of the features of a typical bank fraud scheme, including 
the existence of a broad network of offenders, were absent from her case.  As such, she 
says the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value of Busch’s remarks.  
Tolliver also claims Busch’s testimony was based on out-of-court statements that were 
offered for their truth and that were made by individuals who were shielded from cross 
examination.  By failing to limit Busch’s testimony to the facts of the case, Tolliver 
argues the District Court erred and a new trial should be granted.  We disagree. 
 Inspector Busch’s testimony was both relevant and adequately linked to the facts 
of the case to be helpful to the jury.  Tolliver was charged with participating in a bank 
fraud scheme involving identity theft, and Busch testified about the typical features of 
such an operation.  Several of these features, including the participants, their relationship, 
and the timing of events, were present in Tolliver’s case.  That all of the features were not 
                                                 
8 The decision to correct a plain error is within the discretion of the court of appeals.  
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).  We will not grant relief unless the 
District Court committed clear or obvious errors that “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, 
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in evidence does not mean that Busch’s testimony lacked fit.  Fitness speaks “primarily to 
relevance” and requires that “evidence or testimony ‘assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.’”  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702).  Busch’s testimony provided 
information to assist the jury in understanding how a bank employee who improperly 
accessed customer accounts could be related to individuals who subsequently cashed 
fraudulent checks against them.  It was thus helpful and sufficiently related to both the 
facts and issues to be admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
 Tolliver contends that Busch’s remarks should nonetheless have been excluded 
because they unfairly prejudiced the jury.  She claims his testimony was offered to fill 
evidentiary gaps in the prosecution’s case and to support the inference that she acted 
consistently with the behavior of someone involved in a typical bank fraud.  Further, 
because Busch was one of the agents who investigated Tolliver, the jury was misled to 
believe he had information not presented to them.  We disagree.   
 Under Fed. R. Evid. 403, relevant evidence should not be allowed if “its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury.”  Most of Busch’s testimony concerned the nature of a 
typical bank fraud scheme involving identity theft.  He discussed Tolliver’s case only to 
respond to defense counsel’s questions regarding the absence of certain features common 
to other investigations, and to explain, in general terms, the scope of the broader bank 
                                                                                                                                                             
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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fraud of which Tolliver’s case was thought to be a part.  Busch did not offer any opinions 
about whether he thought Tolliver’s case was typical or whether she was guilty.  Though 
Busch was both an expert witness and a case agent, he did not stray from relevant topics 
or offer sweeping conclusions about Tolliver’s activities.  See United States v. Dukagjini, 
326 F.3d 45, 54 (2d Cir. 2002).  Thus we conclude that his testimony was neither 
prejudicial nor misleading, and its probative value outweighed any danger of confusion. 
 Tolliver’s final contention is that Busch’s testimony violated the Confrontation 
Clause.  Busch referenced interviews with people from past investigations when 
responding to questions from both the prosecution and defense.  Tolliver claims these 
remarks were prejudicial and should have been excluded.  We disagree.   
 The Supreme Court has held that, with limited exceptions, the Sixth Amendment 
bars out-of-court testimonial statements of absent witnesses. Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 53-4 (2004).  Regarding experts, the Fourth Circuit has found that Crawford 
“in no way prevents [them] from offering their independent judgments merely because 
those judgments were in some part informed by their exposure to otherwise inadmissible 
evidence.”  United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 635 (4th Cir. 2009).  Only “where 
the [expert] witness is used as little more than a conduit or transmitter for testimonial 
hearsay” would his reliance on inadmissible hearsay become problematic.  Id.  “The 
question is whether the expert is, in essence, giving an independent judgment or merely 
acting as a transmitter for testimonial hearsay.”  Id. 
 Busch was not simply a means of passing impermissible hearsay to the jury.  He 
was an expert who testified on a range of topics concerning bank fraud and identity theft 
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schemes.  The times he did specifically reference interviews from past investigations it 
was clear his answers “derived over many years and from multiple sources.”  Id. at 636.  
He was not simply parroting witnesses’ out-of-court testimonial statements, but rather 
applying his own expertise to answer the questions posed to him by counsel.  Id. at 635.  
Further, his responses did not suggest that he was relying on information supplied by 
informants associated with his investigation of Tolliver.9
 We conclude that allowing Busch’s testimony did not “seriously affect the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, the District Court did not commit plain error, 
and we will deny Tolliver’s request for relief on that ground. 
  Because Busch’s remarks were 
based on his extensive experience and were subject to cross examination during which 
counsel could explore his sources, his testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause. 
C. 
 Tolliver’s final contention is that she deserves a new trial because her trial counsel 
was constitutionally ineffective.  She claims that her counsel should have requested 
information regarding the foundation for Busch’s opinions beyond what was disclosed in 
the government’s letter disclosure pursuant to Fed. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G).  Similarly, 
                                                 
9 During cross examination, counsel asked Busch if there was evidence that Tolliver had 
contacted any “bad guys.”  Busch said the investigators received information that 
Tolliver had been contacting Jeffrey Thomas.  Through follow-up questions, defense 
counsel elicited that Thomas was being investigated but had not been arrested as part of 
the case.  There was no other testimony about Thomas.  During re-direct examination, 
and upon defense counsel’s objection, the Court asked Busch whether anyone other than 
the two check runners had been arrested and had any connection to Tolliver.  Busch 
answered no. 
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counsel should have raised more questions or offered more objections to Busch’s 
testimony during trial.  By failing to take these steps, Tolliver claims her counsel did not 
subject the prosecution’s case to “meaningful adversarial testing.”  Kansas v. Ventris, 129 
S. Ct. 1841, 1845 (2009) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)). 
 In general, we will not entertain claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on 
direct appeal.  United States v. Haywood, 155 F.3d 674, 678 (3d Cir. 1998).  “We have 
repeatedly held that the proper avenue for pursuing such claims is through a collateral 
proceeding in which the factual basis for the claim may be developed.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  However, there is a narrow exception for cases in which the 
record is sufficiently robust as to allow a determination on the merits without the benefit 
of an evidentiary hearing.  See id.  Although both parties contend the record contains 
enough information on which to base a conclusive assessment of trial counsel’s 
performance, we think the most prudent course is to bring Tolliver’s claim up on 
collateral review.  This disposition leaves Tolliver free to pursue her ineffective 
assistance claim in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  If 
Tolliver elects to pursue her ineffective assistance of counsel claim further, she may do 
so within the framework of a collateral review proceeding. 
